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WILLIAM FAUVER, Commissioner of Department of 
Corrections; WILLIAM PLANTIER, Superintendent of 
A.D.T.C.; SGT. THOMAS MORAN; SCO. BARRAGUS, 
Mailroom Officer; SGT. BUCHANAN, They are all being 
sued in their official and individual capacity 
 
APPEAL FROM THE 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
 
(D.C. Civil No. 95-06173) 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 9, 1997 
 
BEFORE: GREENBERG, LEWIS and MCKEE, 
Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed July 10, 1997) 
 
 
Lorenzo Oliver, #221344 
Trenton State Prison 
CN 861 
Trenton, NJ 08625 
 
 Pro Se Appellant 
 
Andrew Sapolnick 
Office of the Attorney General 
 of New Jersey 
Division of Law 
Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex, 
 CN 112 
Trenton, NJ 08625 
 
 Attorney for Appellees 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
LEWIS, Circuit Judge. 
 
Appellant, Lorenzo Oliver, is an inmate at the Adult 
Diagnostic & Treatment Center at Avenel, New Jersey 
("ADTC"). Oliver, acting pro se, appeals from an order of the 
district court granting the summary judgment motions of 
Appellees, the Commissioner of the New Jersey Department 
of Corrections, the Superintendent of ADTC and various 
individual correction officers at ADTC (collectively 
"Defendants").1 Oliver sought relief against the Defendants 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging equal protection and due 
process violations and deprivation of access to the courts. 




Oliver's section 1983 claim arises from an incident 
among Oliver, an ADTC corrections officer and an orange. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Defendants are William Fauver, Commissioner of the New Jersey 
Department of Corrections; William Plantier, Superintendent of ADTC; 
Corrections Sergeant Thomas Moran; Corrections Sergeant Kathy 
Buchanan; and Senior Corrections Officer Daniel Barajas. 
 
                                2 
On September 9, 1995, Sergeant Thomas Moran saw Oliver 
approaching the outdoor recreational area of the ADTC with 
an orange in his hand. Moran instructed Oliver to throw 
the orange away or take it back to his cell. Oliver 
responded, "You've got to be f---ing kidding me" and 
proceeded into the yard. Oliver then apparently became 
loud and boisterous and threw the orange into the garbage. 
Moran ordered Oliver to retrieve the orange from the trash 
and take it up to his cell. When Oliver refused to comply 
with this order, Moran charged him with refusing to obey 
an order in violation of New Jersey Administrative Code 
10A:4-4.1.256. 
 
A hearing officer found Oliver guilty on this charge and 
sanctioned him to a 30-day loss of recreational privileges. 
Oliver appealed the guilty finding through the appropriate 
state appellate channels, alleging a due process violation 
and a claim that Moran had violated his civil rights. The 
New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, upheld the 
hearing officer's decision. 
 
On December 4, 1995, Oliver filed a complaint in the 
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, 
again alleging various civil rights violations. Specifically, 
Oliver alleged that Sergeant Moran had discriminated 
against him on the basis of race when Moran issued the 
disciplinary charge against Oliver for disobeying an order.2 
Oliver also alleged that officers at ADTC had on three 
separate occasions returned his outgoing mail to him 
without mailing it and on at least one occasion had opened 
his outgoing mail.3 In his complaint, Oliver did not allege 
any actual injury caused by the Defendants' alleged 
interference with his mail. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Oliver, an African-American prisoner, claimed that Moran had violated 
his "right to equal protection . . . by ordering him to go into a garbage 
can and get an orange out to degrade him [in front of white prisoners] 
because of the color of his skin." 
 
3. The outgoing mail was addressed to the Clerk of the New Jersey 
Appellate Court, the state Attorney General, and the Commissioner of 
the Department of Corrections. The mail allegedly contained a notice of 
appeal and a brief relating to the orange incident. 
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The Defendants moved for partial summary judgment on 
the claims arising directly from the orange incident, arguing 
that those claims were barred by the doctrine of res 
judicata. The district court granted the Defendants' motion, 
finding that the New Jersey courts had already adjudicated 
Oliver's due process and equal protection claims. Oliver v. 
Fauver, Civ. No. 95-6173, slip op. at 7-8 (D.N.J. Aug. 16, 
1996) ("[I]t is evident that [Oliver] seeks to relitigate a claim 
that has been finally adjudicated in the state court 
system."). 
 
Soon after the district court's entry of summary judgment 
in favor of the Defendants, they filed another motion for 
summary judgment on Oliver's remaining claim relating to 
the Defendants' alleged interference with his access to the 
courts. Again, the district court granted the Defendants' 
motion. Relying on the Supreme Court's recent opinion in 
Lewis v. Casey, 116 S. Ct. 2174, 2179 (1996), the district 
court held that Oliver could not prevail on his access-to- 
the-courts claim because he had failed to allege actual 
injury caused by the alleged interference. Oliver v. Fauver, 
Civ. No. 95-6173, letter op. at 2 (D.N.J. Sept. 13, 1996). 
The court further noted that, notwithstanding Oliver's 
failure to allege actual injury, the record indicated that no 
such injury occurred -- i.e., that Oliver's mail did, in fact, 
eventually reach its intended destination. Id.  
 
The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 




We exercise plenary review over a district court's grant of 
summary judgment. Small v. Lehman, 98 F.3d 762, 765 (3d 
Cir. 1996). 
 
Our primary concern on appeal is whether the district 
court properly concluded that Oliver was required to show 
that he was actually injured by the Defendants' alleged 
interference with his access to the courts.4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. We will affirm without discussion the district court's grant of summary 
judgment in favor of the Defendants on the due process and equal 
protection claims. We agree that these claims are barred by the doctrine 
of res judicata. 
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Oliver relies on Bieregu v. Reno, 59 F.3d 1445 (3d Cir. 
1995), to argue that actual injury need not be alleged when 
the defendant's conduct deprives an inmate of a "central" 
aspect of the right to court access. In Bieregu, we set forth 
a two-prong standard for analyzing denial of court access 
claims. Bieregu claimed that prison officials had violated 
his right of access to the courts by repeatedly opening his 
legal mail outside of his presence. Id. at 1448. In rejecting 
the government's argument that Bieregu was required to 
show that he was "actually denied" access to the courts, we 
distinguished "ancillary" aspects of court access from 
"central" aspects of court access.5  We noted that while 
claims stemming from the denial of "ancillary" aspects 
required actual injury, claims arising from the denial of 
"central" aspects did not. Id. at 1455. Finally, we concluded 
that 
 
repeated violations of the confidentiality of a prisoner's 
incoming court mail are more central than ancillary to 
the right of court access, and thus no showing of 
actual injury is necessary for plaintiff to establish that 
the right has been infringed. We are satisfied that a 
practice of opening court mail outside an inmate's 




Thus, Bieregu established that in cases involving a 
prisoner's legal mail being repeatedly opened outside of his 
presence, a showing of actual injury was not required. Id. 
 
Shortly after Bieregu was decided, the Supreme Court 
considered the "actual injury" requirement in right-to- 
court-access cases. See Lewis v. Casey, 116 S. Ct. 2174 
(1996). Casey involved a class action on behalf of all adult 
prisoners incarcerated by the State of Arizona Department 
of Corrections. The prisoners alleged that the prison library 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. We defined "ancillary" aspects of court access as those aspects "which 
`may affect merely comfort or convenience without depriving a prisoner 
of access,' " such as a prison's refusal to supply pens or paper when the 
prisoners had sufficient funds to purchase the items themselves. Id. at 
1455 (quoting Peterkin v. Jeffes, 855 F.2d 1021, 1041 (3d Cir. 1988)). In 
contrast, a "central" aspect would include a practice that "inhibits an 
inmate's ability to protect his legal rights." Bieregu, 59 F.3d at 1455. 
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was inadequate and, thus, effectively denied them access to 
the courts. Noting that the requirement of actual injury 
"derives ultimately from the doctrine of standing," the Court 
held that to pursue a claim of denial of access to the courts 
an inmate must allege actual injury, such as the loss or 
rejection of a legal claim. Id. at 2179. While the Court did 
not discuss whether the adequacy of the prison library 
involved an "ancillary" or "central" aspect of the right to 
court access, it is clear that it found such a distinction 
irrelevant for purposes of the actual injury requirement. 
 
In any event, as we pointed out in Bieregu, the adequacy 
of a prison law library involves "issues central to the right 
of court access." Bieregu, 59 F.3d at 1455 (citing Peterkin, 
855 F.2d at 1039, 1041-42). As such, there is no question 
that after Casey, even claims involving so-called central 
aspects of the right to court access require a showing of 
actual injury. That is, the inmate must "demonstrate that 
the alleged shortcomings . . . hindered his efforts to pursue 
a legal claim." Casey, 116 S. Ct. at 2179. 
 
It is clear, then, that Casey has effectively overruled 
Bieregu. Accordingly, we reject Oliver's reliance on Bieregu 
to avoid the actual injury requirement. As the district court 
noted, the record indicates that Oliver suffered no injury as 
a result of the alleged interference with his legal mail. His 
papers addressed to the New Jersey Superior Court did 
arrive, as evidenced by the fact that his appeal was 
considered and adjudicated by that court. In addition, the 
district court received correspondence from Oliver and 
considered the arguments raised therein. Because Oliver 
was not prejudiced by the Defendants' alleged interference 
with his mail, the district court properly granted summary 
judgment in favor of the Defendants. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of 
the district court. 
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